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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
It is urged that the Legislature respond to the difficulties presented
by the diverse and complex nature of unincorporated associations.
Those associations that function as major forces in society should be
subject to those obligations imposed on corporate bodies. Labor unions
in particular should be treated as entities for substantive as well as pro-
cedural purposes. Unincorporated associations should possess the capac-
ity to sue or be sued in their own name, and the association's treasury
must be available to satisfy a judgment resulting from the activities
of its members in areas germane to the organization's normal purposes
or functions. An examination of this area of the law is long overdue.
ARTcL 11 - POOR PERSONS
CPLR 1102: Indigent defendant has constitutional right to counsel in
matrimonial action.
In Boddie v. Connecticut,72 the United States Supreme Court held
that a state's refusal to allow an indigent divorce plaintiff access to its
courts without first paying fees for filing and service of process violates
his due process rights. The New York courts have applied this holding
to auxiliary expenses such as publication costs.7
Boddie recently received a broad construction by the Supreme
Court, Kings County. In Vanderpool v. Vanderpool,74 the court held
that the defendant-wife in a divorce action was constitutionally entitled
to counsel where her indigency and her husband's inability to payT5 are
undisputed. Relying on the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the court found that while CPLR 110276 gives the court discre-
tion to assign counsel to poor persons, it confers no authority to direct
payment of counsel fees. However, the court reasoned that without
counsel a defendant has no meaningful opportunity to be heard, and
the mere fact that he is in the action as a defendant does not constitute
access since "presence is distinguishable from access ... 77
72401 U.S. 871 (1971).
73 See, e.g., Deason v. Deason, 32 N.Y.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1978);
Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 88 App. Div. 2d 431, 830 N.Y.S.d 550 (2d Dep't 1972); McCandless v.
McCandless, 88 App. Div. 2d 171, 827 N.Y.S.2d 896 (4th Dep't 1972).
74 74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1978) (mem.).
75 DRL 287 provides that generally the husband can be compelled to pay the wife's
counsel fees if she is unable to do so.
76 CPLR 1102(a) provides that "[t]he court in its order permitting a person to pro-
ceed as a poor person may assign an attorney." The meaning of "may" in this context
is unsettled. See 2 WIMM 1102.01 (suggesting that the appointment of counsel is dis-
cretionary); but see 7B McOKNY's CPLR 1102, commentary at 480 (1963) (suggesting
that the validity of an order to proceed as a poor person when the court does not ap.
point counsel is an open question).
7774 Misc. 2d at 125, 844 N.YS.2d at 576 (emphasis in original), citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 872 U.S. 835 (1968).
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Thus, under the authority of Deason v. Deason,78 Justice Heller
directed the City of New York to provide counsel or, in lieu of that,
to pay the fees of counsel selected by the defendant. He further recom-
mended the amendment of the County Law,79 which now provides for
the assignment and compensation of counsel in criminal cases, to en-
compass indigent matrimonial defendants.
Much of the language of Vanderpool could be applied with equal
force to an indigent plaintiff in a matrimonial action. It remains to be
seen to what extent the courts will apply Boddie in this area as well as
in non-matrimonial civil litigation.80
ARTICLE 31 -DIscLOSURE
CPLR 3101(a): Appellate departments adopt a strict approach to dis-
covery and inspection of insurance policy limits.
In the absence of a definitive ruling by the Court of Appeals, New
York case law remains uncertain on the issue of whether a plaintiff
in an automobile accident case can compel disclosure of a defendant's
automobile liability insurance policy limits."' Lower court cases arriv-
ing at conflicting results have differed in their interpretation of Allen
v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 2 wherein the Court of Appeals
adopted a liberal construction of CPLR 3101(a) so as to mandate
"disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which
will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing
delay and prolixity.'18 s Despite the broad scope of this test, the Second
and Third Departments have recently refused to require disclosure
of insurance coverage.
78 82 N.Y.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1973), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 725, 731 (1973).
79 N.Y. CouNrY LAW art. 18-B (McKinney 1973).
80 The First Department, relying on Boddie, has held that an indigent tenant is en-
titled to assigned counsel and witness fees in an eviction proceeding. Hotel Martha Wash-
ington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. T. 1st Dep't
1971).
81 Compare Shutt v. Pooley, 43 App. Div. 2d 59, 349 N.Y.S.2d 839 (3d Dep't 1978)
(discovery disallowed); Mosca v. Pensky, 42 App. Div. 2d 708, 345 N.Y.S.2d 606 (2d Dep't
1973) (mem.) (discovery disallowed); Fierman v. Cirillo, 40 App. Div. 2d 976, 338 N.Y.S.2d
285 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.) (discovery disallowed); Sashin v. Santelli Constr. Co., 69 Misc.
2d 695, 330 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1972) (discovery disallowed); Gold v.
Jacobi, 52 Misc. 2d 491, 276 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966) (discovery disal-
lowed), with Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. Ry. 302, 324
(1968) (very liberal disclosure policy enunciated); State Nat'l Bank v. Gregorio, 68 Misc.
2d 926, 828 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Sur-
vey, 47 Sr. JoHN's L. REV. 148, 170 (1973) (discovery allowed).
8221 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968).
83 Id. at 406, 235 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
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